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In recent years, the Federal Reserve (Fed) has adopted a number of targets of monetary policy
all of which are purported to be linked to the rate of inflation, Many commentators have
criticized the Fed’s choice of targets, or its apparent predilection to choose whichever target
appears to be pointing in the “right” direction. We have carefully examined this issue in a
previous Levy Institute  Policv  Brief  (Flvinn  Blind) and concluded that Fed policy is
increasingly rudderless, driven as much by intuition as by solid evidence that inflation is on
the verge of accelerating. In spite of concerns shared by many that the Fed’s choice of targets
may be problematic, most observers are willing to credit the Fed with success at achieving
low and stable rates of inflation in recent years. Further, the proposition that the Fed should
fight inflation is seemingly noncontroversial. The Fed has time and again stated its belief that
the most important role it plays is one of inflation-fighting. Indeed, it has repeatedly asserted
that its ultimate goal  & and must be  price stability. Many theorists and policy-makers have
also adopted this view, with a few going so far as to assert that zero inflation should be the
& goal of monetary policy.’ Finally, given that none of the traditional targets of monetary
policy seems to be closely correlated with inflation, some theorists and policy-makers have
advocated the use of a price index as both the target and the  & of monetary policy.
In this paper, we examine the most frequently cited index used to measure inflation--
the Consumer Price Index (CPI). We will argue that this measure deviates in several
important respects from an ideal, theoretical measure of inflation that would accurately reflect
market-caused price increases and that would potentially fall under control of monetary
policy, We first attempt to determine which components have tended to pull up the overall
rate of inflation as measured by the CPI. We next  analyze  the avenues through whichmonetary policy might attenuate the rate of price increases of these individual components of
the CPI. We conclude that the CPI does not reflect market conditions, nor are those
components that have bolstered inflation of the CPI likely to be directly affected by monetary
policy. This leads us to question whether the rate of increase of the CPI is, indeed, an
appropriate “ultimate goal” of monetary policy. That is, leaving aside the difficult question as
to which economic data should be chosen as “operating targets” of the day-to-day operations
of the Fed (such as monetary aggregates, interest rates, reserves), we question whether the
Fed should be setting its sights on an aggregate price index such as the CPI. We also question
whether Fed “success” or “failure” is appropriately measured by the rate of change of the CPI.
Indeed, we doubt that monetary policy over the past decade and a half has been the primary
cause of declining inflation rates as measured by  the  CPI.
To some extent, our analysis is consistent with the recent concerns expressed over
apparent biases of the CPI when used as a cost-of-living index; indeed, even the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) has consistently denied that the CPI measures cost-of-living. Most
economists now conclude that the CPI seriously overestimates the “actual” rate of inflation.
Recently, an Advisory Commission was formed to study the CPI. An Interim Report to the
Senate Finance Committee was issued by the Commission on September 15,  1995-known  as
the “Boskin Report”--in which estimates of the bias were provided. According to this
Commission, five different kinds of bias combine to cause the CPI to overestimate actual
inflation by 1 to 2.7 percentage points in recent years. This has led to proposals that would
reduce cost-of-living adjustments to benefits from Social Security, Supplemental Security
Income, Military Retirement, Civil Service Retirement, veterans’ compensation and pensions,
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and to personal exemptions would be reduced. It should be emphasized that the purpose of
the Boskin Report was to estimate the extent to which the CPI mismeasures changes of  cost-
of-living.
Our purposes here are different, however. Although we are concerned with the extent
to which the CPI may mismeasure an inflation rate, our primary concern is that CPI may not
be an appropriate target or goal of monetary policy. If the CPI does indeed overstate inflation,
the Fed might inappropriately adopt tight policy. There are two types of problems involved.
The first involves various biases as discussed in the Boskin Report and elsewhere. The second
involves the distinction between an index that attempts to provide an empirical measure of
inflation versus the use of an index as a target or goal of monetary policy. The first might be
corrected by taking account of the biases discussed in the Boskin Report, but the second
problem will not be easily resolved. Assume, for example, that the CPI rate of inflation is
upwardly biased by 2 percentage points (which falls within the range of bias for cost-of-living
purposes estimated by the Boskin Report) relative to the “true” rate of inflation. Further
assume the Fed has as its medium range goal a rate of inflation of  2%,  but inflation as
measured by the CPI is 3%. Then the Fed might adopt tight policy even though the unbiased
inflation rate were only 1%.
The Boskin Report suggests that much of the bias of the CPI will be eliminated or
reduced as the BLS adopts new methodology. Presumably with all the discussion presently
occurring, the Fed will adjust its inflation targets to account for the biases identified in the
Report. If the Fed were to adopt the point estimate of the Boskin Report, it would adjust the
3reported CPI downward by 1.5 percentage points. Thus, a reported rate of inflation of 3%
would indicate to the Fed that the “true” rate of inflation was only 1.5%; policy would be
formed on that basis. In what follows, we argue that even with the adiustmcnts recommended
by  the Boskin Report, the CPI is not an appropriate  measure  of inflation for the conduct or
evaluation of  monetarv  policy.
We will show that the impact of monetary policy on important components of the CPI
is tenuous at best, calling into question the use of CPI as a target or even goal of monetary
policy. Further, we will argue that any measure of inflation that is used in the formation of
monetary policy should substantially reflect domestic market forces. It would make little
sense to adopt tight money policy to fight inflation that was due to transitory external
“shocks”, measurement errors (for example, quality improvements that were not captured by
the BLS), or other quirks that do not reflect fundamental market interactions. We will argue
that increases of the CPI in recent years have been driven to a great extent by such  non-
market influences. This is partially due to the fact that a large portion of the CPI is comprised
of “imputed” values that are largely unconnected with fundamental market forces that are
likely to be influenced by Fed policy. We suspect there are other important anomalies
reflected in the CPI that make it a poor measure of inflation to be used in monetary policy
formation.
Our analysis focuses on the housing sector because it is an important source of  CPI-
measured inflation and because prices are largely imputed and only very indirectly reflect
market conditions of the housing sector. We also conclude that those components of the CPI
that monetary policy is likely to impact have been declining in importance--this means that a
4given reduction of the overall rate of inflation requires an increasing impact on an ever
diminishing portion of the consumer basket. If price stability is defined as a constant CPI, it
therefore can be achieved only if monetary policy is so tight as to cause falling, prices of a
portion of the consumer basket--a portion that is continually falling. The problem is magnified
if a large part of the basket consists of items whose prices (or imputed prices) are rising and
where these prices are little affected by monetary policy. This situation can be avoided only if
the acceleration of prices of those components that are largely unaffected by monetary policy
fortuitously falls. We believe that such fortuitous circumstances largely explain the recent low
and stable inflation rates achieved. In other words, this result had little to do with Fed
inflation-fighting.
The dangers of adopting erroneous policy increase as the average rate of inflation falls.
When inflation is, say, 15% or more, most observers would support tight monetary policy.
Among the reasons that a consensus would be easy to obtain in the case of such high
inflation, one might cite the following:
*the social and private costs of inflation are significant;
*the benefits from a given inflation reduction would exceed the costs of fighting
inflation;
*problems of measurement error involved in calculating a CPI would be of secondary
importance;
*it is likely that all, or nearly all, of the components of the consumer basket would be
experiencing substantial inflation so that even if policy could impact only a portion of theconsumer basket, there would be little danger of causing deflation of prices of any portion of
the basket.
However, in the case of a measured inflation rate of only 2.5 to 3.0 percent, it is clear that
none of the conditions listed above would be met. At very low levels, it is not at all clear that
the costs of inflation are high, nor is it clear that the benefits of reducing inflation would
exceed the costs of fighting inflation. Second, at very low rates of inflation, small
measurement errors become important. Finally, at low inflation rates, it is quite possible that
many items in the consumer basket are  not  experiencing any inflation. If monetary policy
works primarily on those items that are not contributing to inflation, then there is great danger
that the policy will work only by causing deflation of the prices of some items.
Our results lead us to conclude that if inflationary pressures should be fought through
the use of monetary policy, the CPI is not a good measure of inflation for this purpose. Most
importantly, at low rates of inflation, the dangers of choosing an inappropriate measure
increase.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper, we are convinced that use of any index of
price changes will be fraught with difficulties similar to those outlined here. In our view, this
warrants careful reconsideration of alternative ultimate targets--such as rates of economic
growth or unemployment rates. Given the uncertainties involved in the choice of such
ultimate targets, we think it would be premature to tie the Fed to any particular target,
especially to “price stability”. The closer one gets to “price stability”, the greater are the
problems associated with use of a price index as a target or goal of policy. Therefore, we
believe that this is an inappropriate time to change the guidelines of the Employment Act of
61946 and the Humphrey Hawkins Act of 1978 so as to require the Fed to focus on price
stability and to ignore other important economic indicators of our nation’s well-being.
RECENT TARGETS OF MONETARY POLICY
Traditionally, economists have thought that monetary policy uses tools (open market
operations, discount rates, required reserve ratios) to hit operating targets (fed funds rate,
reserve aggregates) that are believed to be closely related to intermediate targets (short-term
market interest rates, monetary aggregates) in order to achieve longer-run goals (low inflation,
high employment, sufficient economic growth). A graphical representation of these is depicted
in Figure 1. According to this view, only the goals are really important; the operating and
intermediate targets are not by themselves of any consequence. If an operating or intermediate
target does not prove to be reliably linked to the goals, it is dropped in favor of another
target. On the other hand, if one or more of the goals proves to be outside the reach of the
Fed because monetary policy appears to be unable to reliably influence performance of the
economy in that respect, then the goal(s) should be dropped. Finally, it is possible that on
some definition of the Fed’s ultimate goals, monetary policy might indeed be effective. It
would make little sense to define a goal in such a manner as to preclude monetary policy
effectiveness.
This leads to another problem, the policy ineffectiveness problem. Many observers
have called into question the ability of monetary policy to reliably impact ultimate goals like
unemployment or economic growth. Even Chairman Greenspan of the Fed and President
Tietmeyer of the Bundesbank have openly questioned whether monetary policy is effective in
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Growthinfluencing unemployment rates or rates of economic growth over anything, but a very short
period. There appears to be a growing consensus that the central bank can  & impact the
rate of  inflation2  However, as we will argue, there has been little discussion of the
transmission mechanism through which monetary policy is supposed to affect the rate of
inflation. It is not at all clear how monetary policy operates now that we no longer accept the
traditional explanation that “too much money causes inflation”. Indeed, we will argue that the
empirical evidence is not consistent with the belief that central bank policy has been a
primary determinant of inflation rates.
Finally, current monetary policy suffers from problems of measurement of the ultimate
goals of the economy. Many economists now doubt that official unemployment rates are very
useful in reflecting labor market conditions. Others are also calling into question the estimates
of various indicators of economic growth--such as the rate of growth of real GDP, or
productivity growth. Similarly, many--including Chairman Greenspan--agree that the CPI
seriously overstates inflation of the cost-of-living.” Even while we might agree with
Chairman Greenspan, we cannot agree that the CPI is an appropriate measure of inflation for
policy purposes--and we would maintain our position even if the CPI were a perfect measure
of cost-of-living.
Ideally, the measure of inflation on which the Fed should set its sights would reflect
market conditions that potentially can be affected by monetary policy. If for example, an
index of inflation reflected conditions over which monetary policy had no control, this index
would be a useless measure of the Fed’s ultimate goal. Worse, if the Fed’s attempts to lower
inflation only caused the index to increase, it is easy to see how a vicious cycle of perversepolicy would be induced by the  choice  of an inappropriate measure. Suppose all the
inflationary pressures arise from components over which the Fed has no control and the Fed
is able to offset these inflationary pressures by causing deflation of prices of components over
which it does have control. It is obvious that such a policy could cause substantial disruptions
and  even  long-run harm to the economy. We think that in this case, many economists would
agree that the Fed should ignore the inflationary pressures; this could be done by constructing
an alternative index that would exclude the components over which the Fed has no control.
Indeed, by excluding food and energy prices from the CPI in order to create an estimate of
“core inflation” the BLS has been taking such a step. This seems to be done on the belief that
food and energy prices are subject to “external shocks”, or non-market forces. In the case of
food, such shocks arise from poor weather in the US, or from abnormal foreign demand
(which could also result from poor weather); in the case of energy, the problem is that a large
part of petroleum is imported, and the price and quantity of imported oil can be affected by
political matters. Since Fed policy is unlikely to affect either the weather or political factors
in the Middle East, it makes sense to exclude these items from the CPI used to evaluate and
form monetary policy. However, it should be noted that it is impossible to fully exclude these
factors since the prices of energy and of food enter into the price determination of most other
consumer items (very few consumer items are free of corn or petroleum derivatives). Thus,
even if the  & inflationary pressures initially came from politically-induced increases of the
price of oil, a Fed policy  focussed  on “core inflation” would still force deflationary pressures
on other components of the CPI in order to offset the secondary inflationary pressures
imparted by oil prices.In several recent Congressional testimonies, representatives of the Fed seem to have
recognized many of the questions we have posed here. First, there has been a recognition that
the links between traditional operating targets and intermediate targets have become
imprecise, and second, that the links between monetary aggregates and inflation have broken
down. Indeed, this was part of the reason for the Fed’s proposal to use a  & interest rate as
the intermediate target of policy in summer of 1994. [We examined this proposal in a
previous Policy Brief (1994); it seems to have been abandoned due to the negative response it
received.] Moreover, in a number of reports the Fed has emphasized that no single economic
variable, nor any combination of variables can reliably indicate when the economy has
reached a rate of capacity where inflation is likely to accelerate (Greenspan 1995; 1993).
Many economists, Chairman Greenspan included, note that modern economies can stretch
capacity without inducing inflation much more than could economies a decade or so ago.
Further, with greater volumes of international trade, the link between capacity utilization or
employment and inflation is far less rigid.
We are then at a situation in which the Fed has no reliable targets, in which neither
the Fed nor other observers is certain as to what market conditions are likely to generate
inflation, and in which the Fed is uncertain of the transmission mechanism through which
monetary policy is supposed to affect inflation. At the same time, because inflation--as
measured by the CPI--has remained low, most observers credit the Fed with success. Further,
they have come to doubt the Fed’s ability to affect any important economic variable except
inflation in any desirable manner. In the July 19, 1995 midyear review to Congress, Chairman
Greenspan said: “The Federal Reserve believes that the main contribution it can make to
10enhancing the long-run health of the American economy is to  promote  price stability over
time. Our short-run policy  adjustments...must  be consistent with moving toward the long-run
goal of price stability” (p. 7). The report goes on to argue that the current low inflation rates
“should be regarded only as a milepost along the path toward the long-term goal of price
stability”  (p.  13). The recent low and stable inflation rates achieved are  r&,  according to the
Fed, evidence of price stability, While it is not clear what it is meant by “price stability”, it
has been argued that continued vigilance will be required to bring inflation down further so
that “price stability” will be finally  achieved.4
Since there appears to be a correlation between the Fed’s increased focus on inflation
and low and stable inflation rates, it is concluded that the Fed must have, indeed, been the
cause of the low and stable inflation. In other words, it is presumed that the Fed has
demonstrated its ability to hit inflation targets. Furthermore, the inflation experience of the
last few years is contrasted with that of the late  1970s  “proving” that when the Fed switched
to an inflation goal, inflation was reduced. On this basis, the Fed can claim at least partial
victory in recent years as the inflation rate was brought down and has remained at a low
level.
It has been argued that the ultimate goal of monetary policy must be to remove
inflation from economic decision-making of individuals. The Fed has interpreted it as
identifying and using some index like the CPI which must grow at a rate that is so slow that
its growth would not lead to significant cost-of-living adjustments to contractual arrangements
including wage increases that hedge against inflation.In the following sections, we will argue that in at least some situations, monetary
policy can perversely affect the index (that is, tight policy would increase the measured rate
of inflation). This problem increases in seriousness secularly as well as over the course of
each BLS cycle before the usual and periodic revisions are made to the CPI base. This
problem will not be solved by making the adjustments advocated in the Boskin Report, nor by
dropping a few items (as is currently done to obtain the “core inflation rate”), nor by
elaborate “smoothing” of the index (as proposed by Bryan and Cecchetti 1993). If monetary
policy is to be geared to fighting inflation, much greater revisions will be required before an
index is obtained that could be useful in formation and evaluation of monetary policy. We are
skeptical that an aggregate index can be devised to serve such purposes. Finally, and in
concert with our analysis of the CPI, we doubt that monetary policy deserves much credit for
the recent low inflation; nor do we believe that reduced Fed diligence would lead to higher
inflation.
A DETAILED LOOK
The  CPI  tracks
designed to reflect the
AT THE CPI
prices of a market basket of consumer goods and services that is
spending habits of consumers; the most frequently used index is
actually the CPI-U, which tracks the spending of urban consumers. Because baskets change
over time, the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ periodic Consumer Expenditure Survey establishes
a “benchmark” basket to assign weights to various components that will be used to calculate a
consumer price index for coming years. Survey data collected over a three-year period are
used to calculate this benchmark; given the effort involved, the benchmark cannot be revised
12frequently. The benchmark we use here was established based on surveys conducted during
1982-84; these surveys determine the weights used to construct the index. If the prices of all
components of the consumer basket were to increase at the same rate, these weights
established in 1982-84 could still be appropriate today. Because prices grow at different rates
and because consumer buying habits change, component weights are periodically changed.
New weights are currently being established through surveys (conducted in  1993-5),  and will
be used beginning with 1998. The BLS does not release data on the  fixed  component  wcights-
-apparently out of fear that CPI inflation data could be anticipated before they are officially
released. In reality, the BLS does not use fixed component weights, in any case, because
revisions are continually made to account for the changing consumer basket over time. The
relative importance data released closest to the benchmark surveys (usually with a lag of a
couple of years) give the best approximation to the bench year component weights. The
component weights actually used in any given year cannot be obtained, but would be
something between the most current relative importance weights and the relative importance
weights from the year closest to the benchmark year.
Many recent studies, including the Boskin Report, have focused on various
measurement errors involved in calculating the CPJ. For example, if consumers increase the
percent of purchases at “discount” outlets, the CPI will overstate the actual rate of inflation
experienced by the typical consumer--this could be called the “outlet substitution bias”--
because the index does not adequately take into account such shifts. Additionally, consumers
will change the composition of the basket of consumer goods purchased over time; since the
composition of the basket used to calculate the price index is changed only once per decade, a
13bias results.” Economists identify three different kinds of bias associated with changing
baskets: substitution bias, quality change bias, and new product bias. The first refers to the
supposed impact that changing relative prices would have on baskets; if, for example, the
price of tea rises relatively to that of coffee, economic theory suggests that consumers will
substitute coffee for tea. However, as the CPI basket might be changed only once per decade,
the index will be calculated as if no substitution occurred--leading to overstatement of
inflation. Often when prices rise, this reflects increases of the quality of products (products
might last longer or provide a higher level of services); in most cases, it is very difficult to
calculate what portion of a price increase should be attributed to quality changes, and the BLS
does not even attempt to calculate this for many products. Thus, inaccurate measures of
quality change introduce a quality change bias. Finally, new products are introduced all the
time; the BLS includes these in the basket only with long and variable lags, introducing a
new product bias into the CPI. In the case of some goods, a considerable bias results. For
example, many high-technology consumer goods follow a price cycle that begins with very
high prices for goods sold to high income classes, then prices fall rapidly as the goods are
introduced to lower income classes, and then prices gradually rise as the market matures. If
the BLS introduces the goods into the basket only after prices have reached their minimum,
the CPI will not capture the period during which prices fell rapidly, but  d  include the
mature period in which prices rise. In recent years, this bias should be expected to be quite
important.
The Boskin Report identifies another source of bias called the “formula bias”. This
bias results because price data are collected on a disaggregated basis and then aggregated in a
14very complex manner that can introduce anomalies. For example, the calculation method used
in recent years gives too much weight to items on sale; somewhat paradoxically, this
generates formula-induced inflation as the items go off-sale. The degree of this bias can
increase with the frequency of rotation (of outlets included in the sample) because the bias
results from short-run price variability and a method that gives greater weight to  lower-than-
average prices. Researchers had noticed that surveys of average prices actually paid by
consumers showed rates of inflation well below the rates of inflation reported by the CPI for
relatively disaggregated components of the consumer basket; while part of this could be
attributed to the outlet substitution bias, most of it could not. Estimates of the formula bias
run as high as six-tenths of a percentage point for owner-occupied housing and one
percentage point for apparel--an item often on sale (Moulton and Smedley 1995). The Boskin
Report provides the following estimates of all sources of bias:
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15It should be noted that the Boskin Report emphasizes that it has conservatively estimated
biases; even the upper end of the range is meant to err on the side of underestimating
potential bias.
Our concern here, however, is with a different issue, one which results from
differential rates of price increase of the components of the basket. In other words, even if
consumer behavior regarding outlets or composition of baskets did not change, the
contribution of items in the basket to measured CPI inflation will change over  time  due to
differential inflation rates of those items. We will develop a measure of the contribution of
each item to the overall inflation rates. In what follows,  comuonent  weights will refer to the
benchmark or base  vear  shares of components of the CPI which are the “real”,  inflation-
adjusted quantities in the consumer basket and will not change until the next survey
establishes a new benchmark basket. However, the relative  imnortance  of each item reflects
the “nominal” portion of expenditure devoted to each component of the consumer basket--
assuming the component weights do not change. The relative importance of any item that
experiences an above-average rate of inflation will rise, while the relative importance of items
with below-average inflation rates will fall. Finally, the weighted contribution of each item to
the measured CPI inflation rate will provide an estimate of the contribution of the inflation of
the price of each individual item in the basket to the inflation of the price of the overall
index. We will examine the relative importance and weighted contributions to inflation of
each item to the CPI below. However, it is probably instructive to first examine a simulation
to show how these figures are constructed.A SIMULATION: RELATIVE IMPORTANCE AND WEIGHTED CONTRIBUTION
We can first demonstrate the relative importance and weighted contribution concepts
using a simple hypothetical example with a CPI constructed on the basis of a fixed weight
basket that is changed only once per decade. Assume that the base period is 1985, with
component weights calculated from 1983-4. We will divide the components into two
categories: housing (weight is 41.5%) and other (weight is 58.5%). Further assume that all
components experience a constant and uniform annual rate of inflation of 2.5% until 1987,
when the inflation rate of the housing component rises to 10% per year. [The 10% inflation
rate of the housing may be overstated, but illustrates the problem]. The component weights
will not be adjusted until 1998. The CPI will be calculated by multiplying the index for each
component by its weight, then summing the results (for example, take the index for “other” in
the year 1990, multiply by 0.585, then  find  the product of the index for housing in 1990,
multiplied by 0.415, then sum the results). The relative  imnortance  for each sector is
calculated by multiplying the 1985 component weight by the index for the sector, then
dividing by the CPI. This gives an idea of the relative importance of each sector to
calculation of the CPI; relative importance increases for items which experience  higher-than-
average inflation rates. The weighted contribution of each component is found by taking the
one-year change of the index for each component, multiplying by the appropriate component
weight, and dividing by the change of the overall CPI. This provides a measure of the
contribution inflation of the prices of individual components make to inflation of the overall
index, weighted by the 1985 component weights. We will set the index for all components at
100 in 1985. The results are as follows:
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As Table 2 shows, the differential inflation rate quickly raises the relative importance
and weighted contribution of the component that experiences a higher rate of inflation. At the
limit, the housing component would account for a relative importance that would eventually
approach lOO%--but this would take a long time, and by our assumptions, the component
weights will be re-calculated in 1998. In the real world, substitution out of those components
with relatively high inflation rates would reduce the actual component weights that should be
used to calculate the CPI; this will be captured in the change of base weights. But if this is
done only once per decade, substantial upward bias is imparted to the CPI to the extent that
the true component weight of housing (in our example) is below the fixed component weight
used in the calculation of the CPI. Thus, change of relative importance gives some idea of the
18sort of bias introduced into the CPI because a fixed consumption basket is assumed over
periods of ten years (and longer). As would be expected, the sector with the higher inflation
rate very quickly dominates increases of the CPI; weighted contribution is a measure of the
degree to which the inflation of individual components causes inflation of the CPI. In our
example, growth of the housing sector index will very soon come to dominate growth of the
CPI. Note that even if the housing sector is substantially smaller than the “other” sector, its
weighted contribution very quickly approaches 100% simply due to its higher rate of
inflation.
Data on relative importance are regularly published by the BLS, and it is widely
accepted that these data provide some information regarding the bias introduced into the CPI
because the component weights are not changed more frequently. To some extent, however,
the relative importance concept understates the degree to which high inflation of some sectors
is translated into high inflation of the CPI; even if relative importance grows fairly slowly
over the course of a decade, the weighted contribution of those items with higher inflation
rates than average will grow quickly. In our example, the CPI inflation rate has reached 6.8%;
while the relative importance of the housing sector is still less than  60%,  it is clear that the
“contribution” of housing to the measured inflation rate is much larger than that--after all,
prices of all items except housing are growing at a rate of only 2.5% per year. Thus, a
weighted contribution of 83.7% for housing more accurately reflects the “true” impact that
housing sector inflation has on CPI inflation. Note, also, that if component weights would be
recalculated every year, there would be no difference between relative importance and
component weights (this bias is eliminated); however, this would not eliminate growth of the
19weighted contribution of those items experiencing higher-than-average rates of inflation
(unless the component weights of these rapidly fell toward zero). In other words, the problem
we are outlining in development of the concept of weighted contribution is not an artifact of
the method used to calculate a CPI. Rather, it reflects the common sense reality that if some
items tend to have inflation rates that are substantially above average, these items will come
to dominate overall inflation as measured by the rate of growth of an aggregative index.
If the acceptable inflation rate were 2.5% as measured by the CPI, the central bank
would begin intervention in 1988 in our hypothetical example to fight the inflation of the CPI
that is observed to rise above 2.5%. If we assume for the moment that monetary policy has
no effect on the housing component, but that it is effective in lowering the rate of increase of
prices of the other component, it is easy to see that the central bank will not be able to
achieve its inflation targets over the long run. That is, even if the rate of price increase of the
other component were reduced to zero--or even below--the CPI will grow at a rate above
2.5% because the contribution of the housing component rises toward 100%. (This would be
true except in the unlikely case that the deflation of prices of the other component could
approach a large number.) Ironically, this result would be sustained even if consumers bought
no housing services after 1988. Thus, in this extreme case in which housing is eliminated
from the basket actually purchased, the measured excess rate of inflation (above 2.5%) could
be entirely the result of measurement error due to the use of fixed component weights (this is
sometimes called the substitution bias). This will be corrected only when the next base year
component weights are established. When this is done, we might  find  that the CPI inflation
rate drops --that is, as soon as the new component weights are used-- which is entirely due to
20a change of component weights. This cannot be attributed to monetary policy since (by our
assumption) it has no impact on housing sector price increases.
RECENT EXPERIENCE: RELATIVE IMPORTANCE AND WEIGHTED
CONTRIBUTIONS TO INFLATION
We can use the concepts developed in the previous section to examine recent US inflation
experience. Identification of those items of high relative importance will allow us to say
something regarding the potential impact that monetary policy might have on items that have
tended to experience higher-than-average inflation rates. Finally, examination of the weighted
contribution of various components to the CPI will help to determine which items can be
blamed for the high inflation of the 1970s and early  198Os,  as well as to identify those items
responsible for recent inflation.
Table 3 shows the inflation rates of components of the CPI, while Figures 2a and 2b
show the relative importance of various items. Note that during the high inflation of the mid
1970s  the inflation rate of commodities was typically near to that of services; however, in the
high inflation of the late 1970s and early  198Os,  inflation in the service sector was typically
above that of the CPI. Further, both high inflation periods can be characterized as periods that
experienced high inflation of food, housing, and transportation components. Finally, medical
care has typically experienced inflation much above average, although the differential has
diminished somewhat in the most recent years. Differential inflation rates alone cannot
provide much indication of the contribution each component makes to the overall rate of
inflation, however, because the share of the basket devoted to each component must also be
21TABLE  3  Inflation Rates of Major Components of CPI
======================== ==== =========================== ==================
Year CPI All All Food Housing Fuel  & Apparel Transp- Medical Other Shelter Renter Homeowner
Comd Service Utilities ortation costs costs
-- ------------------ ==__==========================---- --------------------D-w-- ___-------- --------------___------D--w-
1968 4.7 3.7 6.1 4.2 5.5 2.2 6.4 1.8 6.2 5.0 6.5 NA NA
1969 5.9 5.2 7.4 6.8 6.4 2. 5.1 4.9 5.8 5.6 8.6 NA NA
1970 5.6 4.2 8.1 2.5 6.9 6.0 4.0 7.5 7.7 5.3 8.9 NA NA
1971 3.3 3.1 4.1 4.4 3.5 6.0 2.2 1.3 4.6 4.3 2.7 NA NA
1972 3.4 3.2 3.5 4.3 3.6 3.5 2.6 2.5 3.3 3.7 4.0 NA NA
1973 8.9 10.4 6.4 18.6 6.7 11.2 4.4 4.5 5.3 4.9 7.1 NA NA
1974 12.1 12.8 11.3 12.1 13.6 16.6 8.6 13.5 12.3 10.1 11.4 NA NA
1975 7.1 6.4 8.0 6.3 7.6 11.5 2.4 9.8 10.0 5.7 7.2 NA NA
1976 5.0 3.5 7.6 1.0 5.4 9.6 4.6 8.9 9.9 5.8 4.2 NA NA
1977 6.7 6.0 7.8 7.3 7.8 8.6 4.3 4.4 8.9 6.3 8.8 NA NA
1978 9.0 9.0 9.3 11.4 9.8 5.6 3.1 7.9 8.6 6.4 11.4 NA NA
1979 13.3 12.9 13.7 10.1 15.3 16.0 5.7 17.5 10.4 7.7 17.5 NA NA
1980 12.4 11.0 14.2 10.1 13.7 13.8 6.9 14.5 10.2 10.2 15.0 NA NA
1981 8.9 6.0 13. 4.1 10.1 14.14 3.6 11.1 12.5 9.8 9.9 NA NA
1982 3.8 3.4 4.2 3.0 3.6 9.4 1.6 1.3 11.1 12.1 2.3 NA NA
1983 3.8 3.0 4.9 2.5 3.6 2.3 3.0 3.9 6.4 8.0 4.8 5.2 NA
1984 4.0 2.7 5.4 3.8 4.3 4.2 2.0 3.2 6.2 6.1 5.2 5.8 5.1
1985 3.8 2.6 5.0 2.8 4.3 2.2 2.9 2.7 6.6 6.3 5.9 6.5 5.9
1986 1.2 -2.0 4.4 3.7 1.9 -5.5 1.0 -6.0 7.8 5.5 4.8 5.1 4.6
1987 4.4 4.6 4.3 3.5 3.7 1.6 5.1 6.1 5.9 6.7 4.9 4.4 5.2
1988 4.4 3. 4.8 5.0 3.9 2.7 4.8 2.9 7.0 6.8 4.4 3.8 4.7
1989 4.6 4.2 5.0 5.5 4.0 3.0 1.4 4.0 8.5 8.3 4.9 4.5 5.2
1990 6.3 6.8 5.9 5.2 4.5 3.8 5.3 10.5 9.6 7.6 5.4 6.8 4.8
1991 3.0 1.2 4.5 2.5 3.5 2.9 3.6 -1.6 7.9 7.9 3.8 4.3 3.7
1992 3.0 2.0 3.7 1.6 2.6 2.2 1.5 3.0 6.7 6.5 3.0 2.9 3.1
1993 2.7 1.5 3.7 2.8 2.7 2.5 1.0 2.4 5.4 2.7 3.0 2.7 3.2
---_--- ----- --- ====_______==========_-_-_=========__-============ --__________-------_--- -----------------------Figure  a@ Relative Importance, Major Categories, 1994Figure% Relative Importance, Commodities and Services, 1994
1994
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-. -. - - - -.taken into account. As the figures show, the service sector’s relative importance is now more
than half; as we will show, most recent inflation of the overall basket is caused by the service
sector.
Table 4 provides an estimate of the weighted contribution of major components to the
overall CPI inflation rate. We have calculated weighted contribution as described in the
previous section. However, as noted above, the BLS does not release data on component
weights. Thus, we used data on relative importance to calculate weighted contribution. We
chose to use “fixed weights” based on relative importance over five year periods. This is
something of a compromise--use of (unavailable) fixed weight components would lead to
lower weighted contributions for items experiencing above average inflation rates; use of
annual relative importance data would lead to higher weighted contribution; thus, use of
relative importance data that is updated each five years provides an estimate between the two
extremes. For the component weight, we used a constant relative importance weight for each
five year period, updated for the subsequent five year period. Thus, the periods and year from
which relative importance was obtained (in brackets) are as follows: 1968-74  [   19711;  1975-79
[1975];  1980-84  [1980];  1985-89  [1985];  and 1990-94  [1990].
We found that three components accounted for most of our inflationary pressures
during the 1970s and early 1980s; reduction of inflation in these three sectors accounts for
most of the disinflation since the mid 1980s. These are food, energy, and housing--during
peak inflationary periods, these have a combined weighted contribution that approaches 90%;
housing alone accounts for half. Figure 3 shows the weighted contribution of food, housing,








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































\  / . ---
\   1 $ <--Housing
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Year
I-foodfhousingftransportation ----_ housing ___ foodfhousingcontribution for the peak inflation periods of 1980 and 1974, respectively. Excluding food and
petroleum “price shocks”, most recent inflation comes from the service sector (commodities
typically have inflation rates well below-average) whose relative importance increases over
each decade. This general picture is not consistent with the conventional wisdom, according
to which tight policy raises finance costs, reducing demand. One would expect that tight
money policy would have its biggest impact on commodities prices, rather than services, due
to greater impact of interest rates on this sector. For example, high interest rates would
depress consumer demand for financed commodities; on the supply side, it would raise costs
of financing inventory (which should have a smaller impact on services). In reality, inflation
rose then fell primarily because the rate of price increase of services rose then fell; since
commodities declined in importance, it takes an increasingly large impact on them to reduce
inflation caused by the service sector. By far the most important component of the service
sector is housing--its relative importance in the CPI is currently above 40% and its weighted
contribution was 50% when inflation was high. Thus, this sector warrants closer examination
as it is possible the Fed’s inflation fighting worked primarily through housing; indeed, many
would list the interest rate-housing sector relation as among the most important transmission
mechanisms of monetary policy. However, this misunderstands the way in which the housing
sector index is calculated. Given the very large relative importance of the housing sector, and
given that it has been the primary contributor to high inflation experienced in the past, it is
important to determine whether monetary policy indeed can operate through this sector to
lower inflation.
23Figure4 Weighted Contribution to CPI Inflation: Housing, Food
Transportation, And All Other, 1980
1980
m Housing m Transportation
v? Food OtherFigures. Weighted Contribution to CPI Inflation: Housing, Food,
Transportation, and All Other, 197’4
B Housing m Transportation
=Food OtherDETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSING SECTOR
It can be seen that the housing component is a major contributor to the construction of the
CPI and, thus, it merits a detailed analysis, to which we now turn. There are two alternative
ways to calculate the contributions of the housing sector to a price index: the flow of services
approach versus the homeowner or “user” cost approach. The method currently used--imputed
rental cost--has been in place since 1983. Previously, the BLS tried to calculate user cost of
housing, but it was believed that the older method mixed investment and consumption
features of home ownership (Gillingham 1980). To some extent the older method resulted in a
measure of inflation that was more appropriate for the purposes of monetary policy formation.
However, it should be noted that since rising interest rates raise mortgage service costs, tight
money policy would perversely impact housing sector inflation even in the pre-1983 period.
We will argue that the imputed rental, or consumption-flow, approach gives incorrect signals
and can lead the Fed to adopt perverse policy.
Two recent papers  (Pollin  and Stone 1991; Gillingham 1980) have analyzed the two
alternative methods of incorporating the housing sector within a CPI, coming to opposite
conclusions regarding the preferred approach. Our purpose here is not to advocate one method
over the other, but rather to acknowledge that each method faces measurement problems and
that they can lead to wide differences in measured CPI inflation rates.  Pollin  and Stone
present the following table which compares the inflation rate of home ownership as measured
by the “old”  @e-1983,  user cost approach) CPI and the “new” (post 1983, consumption flow
approach) CPI:
24TABLE 5: Alternative measures of inflation of home ownership  cost6
As  Pollin  and Stone argue  “[i]t  is remarkable, in short, how much hinges on a technical
argument as to the relative merits of rental equivalence rather than current purchase prices for
deriving the costs of home ownership” (p. 55). Given that home ownership costs play a major
role in the calculation of the CPI, it is not surprising that the two methods can generate very
different estimates of inflation of the CPI; for example, as reported in  Pollin  and Stone, the
overall CPI inflation rate reached 7.7% in 1973 using the old method of calculation, while it
would have been only 4.9% under the method used since 1983 (much--but not all--of the
difference can be attributed to the differing methods of calculating home ownership costs).
Since the old method was used in 1973, the rate of inflation appeared at the time to be
25unbearably high, leading to attempts by workers and others to obtain cost of living increases
related to perceived inflation rates and eventually to tight money policy that resulted in a very
deep recession. In retrospect, using the new method of calculation, we might say that the
inflation rate was not nearly so high as it was believed to be at the time--and a lower official
inflation rate might have actually reduced inflation pressures at the time (by reducing the
pressures that eventually led to the so-called “wage-price spiral”).
While such matters surely warrant greater attention, our concerns are more
fundamental. We recognize that any index will carry some advantages and disadvantages and
that no index can be perfect. The CPI attempts to measure the costs faced by consumers and
is used in cost-of-living adjustments and by the federal government to adjust Social Security
benefits, income tax brackets, and standard income tax deductions. It is not our purpose to
criticize either the appropriateness of the old or new CPI when used for such purposes. We
question, however, the usefulness of the CPI as a target of monetary policy or as a measure
of the success of monetary policy. We have singled out the housing sector because we believe
it is one of the components of the CPI that is very problematic with regard to monetary
policy. Detailed analysis of other components might also cause one to question inclusion of
them in any index of inflation that is to be used as a basis of monetary policy.
Let us first look in detail at the relative importance of various housing sector items.
Table 6 shows relative importance of housing sector components for December 1994.
26TABLE  6: Expenditure Groups and Relative Importance, Housing Sector
December 1994




Renter’s  Costs 8.0
Residential Rent 5.8%
Other Renters’ costs 2.2%
Homeowners’ costs 19.9
Owners’ equivalent rent 19.5
Household insurance 0.4
Maintenance and repairs 0.2
Fuel and other utilities 7.1
Household furnishings and operations 6.1
From: Relative Importance of  Comuonents  in the Consumer Price Indexes, 1994, U.S Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
We are focusing on the housing sector for several reasons. First, it accounts for more
than 40% of the CPI; because the housing sector has generally experienced inflation rates
above the average, its relative importance tends to rise over the course of each decade and its
weighted contribution to inflation is typically near 50% whenever overall inflation is high.
Second, many observers argue that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy operates
to a great extent through the housing sector: higher interest rates raise construction finance
costs, reducing supply, and higher mortgage rates discourage demand; as the housing sector
slows, this exerts downward pressure on the economy as a whole. It is then logical to assume
that because monetary policy operates through the housing sector, inflation in the housing
27sector should certainly be incorporated into any overall inflation index that is adopted as a
target of monetary policy. We will call into question such an argument: the housing sector
component of the  CPI  does not capture inflation in the housing sector, nor is monetary policy
able to exert direct pressure on the rate of price change of the housing component.
A brief examination of the method used to calculate the contribution of the housing
component to the new CPI is required. We are primarily concerned with the shelter
component, which accounted for 28% of the 1994 CPI (or, more than two-thirds of the
housing sector relative importance); of this, renters’ costs account for 8% and homeowners’
costs account for nearly 20%. The majority of renters’ costs is the residential rent component
(5.8%) while the majority of homeowners’ costs is the owners’ equivalent rent (19.5%). The
BLS uses a survey of rental units to obtain data regarding changes of rental price; the results
are adjusted through a weighted average process, and quality adjustments are made to deal
with aging and improvements. The method used for owners’ equivalent rent (OER) is more
complicated, Field agents ask owners for the rental price the homeowner believes the house
could rent; agents may enter their own estimate if they believe the owner’s estimate is
unreasonable. These survey data are used to establish the base year imputed rent; “subsequent
values of implicit rent for a given unit are derived by using changes in rent that occur in a
specific subsample of the residential rent units used for the residential rent unit” (Rogers et al
p. 34). In other words, the rate of increase of OER is obtained by applying the rate of
increase of prices of rental units that are thought to be similar in certain respects (location,
structure type, quality).
28Some  observers have criticized this practice, noting that rental  units are generally not
comparable to owner occupied houses even in the same neighborhoods  (for example, rental
units initially used for comparison tended to be smaller), and the BLS has  reacted to such
complaints by attempting to obtain better matching. More fundamentally, other critics have
argued that rentals and owner-occupied units are not comparable for a variety of other reasons
(see  Pollin  and Stone  1991  for a summary). Perhaps the most important  observation  is that
the rental market for single family detached housing is small and distinct from that for  owner-
occupied single family detached housing. In particular, 85% of single family detached  houses
are owner-occupied. The BLS method relies on the rate of increase of the rental portion of the
market--a portion that is small (only 15% of the market) and that  may  not represent a good
substitute for the large part of the market--to obtain estimates of the rate of increase of the
owner-occupied portion of the market. Again, this would not be important if OER were a
small part of the CPI--but its relative importance is one-fifth and its weighted contribution to
inflation reaches as high as  fifty  percent. As Figure 6 shows, the shelter component drives the
weighted contribution of the housing sector.
Several questions about the use of the CPI as a target of monetary policy can be
raised. For instance, assume that due to a limited supply of rentals on the market relative to
demand, the rental price of single family detached houses rises rapidly. This leads to a high
rate of inflation of residential rent and imputed OER. This can occur independently of the
course of prices of owner-occupied single family detached housing (whether new or used), as
well as independently of the  quantity  or  cost  of current construction of such housing. Given
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coststransmitted to the CPI. The Fed observes the high inflation rate of the CPI and adopts tight
money policy. Those who might have been considering the purchase of detached single family
housing decide to postpone purchase given the high interest rate, and choose to rent such a
dwelling in the meantime. This increases the excess demand for such rentals, raising the rate
of inflation of rentals  & of the imputed OER, further increasing the rate of inflation as
measured by the CPI. The tight policy raises inflation rates and could lead to a vicious cycle
of interest rate hikes, depressed real estate markets for detached single family homes, but
rising rents and imputed rents (OER). Furthermore, the higher interest rates could be passed
along by landlords to renters in the form of higher rents--further exacerbating the measured
inflation problem. Certainly this is not a sustainable situation, but the point is that the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy fails to resolve the balance in a very small part
of the market for detached single family homes that transmits imputed price increases to the
large market for such dwellings that becomes destabilized by the monetary policy. Further,
the central bank obtains incorrect signals regarding the problem by focusing on the CPI, and
monetary policy provides inappropriate incentives (since one solution would be to lower
interest rates to encourage home purchases and thereby relieve congestion in the rental
market).
This is just one example, and it is possible to conceive of other situations in which the
housing component of the CPI sends the wrong signal to the central bank. For example,
suppose the rental market is not congested, but a speculative boom has caused rapid increase
of the price of owner-occupied housing (new and used). This would apparently warrant tighter
monetary policy to reduce demand by raising mortgage rates, however, the inflationary
30pressures may not be captured at all in the CPI until the normal rate of transition of detached
housing from owner-occupancy to rentals plus the normal rate of turnover in the rental market
(due to construction of new units and razing of old units) leads to higher rental prices, or
until bottlenecks force prospective homeowners into the rental market. There is ample reason
to suppose this would not necessarily be a timely process, given lags and the methodology
used in constructing the CPI. While it is true that the higher prices for detached  owner-
occupied housing will be reflected in higher base prices obtained through the subsequent
survey, it will take some time for the rate of turnover of the sample to proceed to such an
extent that the base will fully reflect the new higher prices (housing units can remain in the
base for as long as 10 years).
Conventional analysis of the “transmission mechanism” of monetary policy would
emphasize the link between interest rates and the housing and investment sectors, in addition
to that between interest rates and consumer durables. A recent study by Steven Fazzari (1995)
has cast doubt on the relation between interest rates and investment in plant and equipment.
Our analysis has cast doubt on the relation between monetary policy and inflation of the
housing component of the CPI. While there may still remain a link between monetary policy
and the housing sector (for example, due to the impact on new construction, or due to impacts
on mortgage rates that affect demand), we have shown that this will be transmitted to
measured inflation rates in a very indirect manner. Indeed, as we argued, the impact could
easily be perverse. Finally, there is no reason to suppose that inflation as measured by the
CPI accurately reflects market conditions for owner-occupied housing. Thus, housing inflation
as measured for the CPI is both a poor indicator to be used in policy formation and is
31unlikely to be affected in the desired direction by monetary policy. To reemphasize, housing
represents more than 40% of the CPI, and two-thirds of this is rental or imputed rental costs
wherein lie the problems we have been discussing.
IS INFLATION AROUND THE CORNER?
The period 1973-79, during which inflation accelerated and led to the current
preoccupation with inflation, can be characterized as follows. First, there was a rather rapid
growth of housing services prices and an increase in the share of housing services
contribution to the total inflation rate over the decade of the 1970s; by 1980-1, housing
accounted for 50% of the--much above average--inflation rate. Second, gasoline prices
increased by 41% between July 1973 and July 1974, raising the transportation share of
inflation over the next few years to about a fifth during 1975-6; another “oil price shock” in
1979-80 again raised the gasoline inflation rate above 40% and raised transportation’s share
of CPI inflation to nearly a quarter. In 1981, transportation and housing accounted for 75% of
total inflation. Finally, rapid inflation of food prices in 1973-4 and 1978-9 compounded the
problem as the contribution of food to inflation rose to around 25% in the first peak inflation
period, and to 20% in the second. The attribution of both “great inflations” (1973-5, 1979-81)
to “food and energy shocks” will come as no surprise; it may be a little more surprising to
find that housing services played a much larger role, accounting for as much as 50% of  the
measured CPI inflation rate. Few would argue that monetary policy should be credited for the
eventual reduction of inflation of energy and food prices; we have also argued that tight
money policy could have had perverse impacts on housing inflation, but in any case would
32not generally have a direct and predictable impact on housing price inflation as measured for
the CPI. Thus, those components that accounted for up to 90% of the “Great Inflations” are
substantially outside the control of the Fed.
The institutional environment of the late 1980s and 1990s is much different from that
of the 1970s and early 1980s. Recent inflation has been driven by measurement problems and
by fairly unique and presumably short-lived rapid price increases in certain items in the
consumer basket--particularly services, and  more  specifically, housing and medical costs (and
to a lesser extent, to education  costs).7  Figure 7 shows the relative shares of shelter, medical
services, and commodities for 1991-3. It is readily apparent that most inflation in the early
1990s comes not from commodities, but from services--in particular, from shelter and medical
services. In the case of commodities, there is little evidence that re-inflation is imminent--
food and apparel prices are nearly stagnant, gasoline prices have fallen nearly as often as they
have risen, and transportation prices are just keeping pace with the CPI growth. In the case of
services, housing prices are now actually rising at a rate below that of the CPI as the real
estate boom is finished in most of the country; while medical care prices had been increasing
twice as fast as the CPI, in late 1994 and early 1995 price increases were just above the
overall inflation  rate.’  Moreover, these price movements, we are convinced, are not
substantially affected by the Fed’s “tine-tuning” of interest rates.
In sum, it can be seen that the facts do not justify the Fed’s concern with inflationary
pressures at present. There is no danger of rapid inflation of manufactured goods prices
because of world-wide excess capacity and capital movement to low wage economies.
Nominal wages and labor costs in the US have not kept pace with inflation--and unions have
33Figure7  . Weighted Contributions, Relative Shares: All Commodities,
Shelter Services, and Medical Services
1991 1992 1993
lb-All  commodities  m Medical services  B Shelter services1been a less significant force in the American economy. Indeed, unit labor costs are falling.
The only danger of inflationary pressures comes from rising interest costs and possibly from
tax increases if Congress really tries to balance the budget by raising taxes. In particular,
concern about Social Security could lead to rising payroll taxes, which would be inflationary.
It is hard to see how monetary policy can be used to fight inflation that results from
medical care, oil price shocks, rising rents and imputed rents, education, interest costs, or tax
hikes. It is unlikely to diminish pressures from any of these areas that are so significant in
terms of their contribution to the CPI measure of inflation. Monetary policy then must
perversely punish other sectors that do not contribute much to measured CPI inflation.
CONCLUSIONS
We have argued elsewhere  (1995) that current Fed intervention should be reduced in light of
its new-found realization that central banking is an art, not a science. In this paper, we have
extended this argument, showing that the CPI is not a good guide for monetary policy, nor is
a constant CPI a reasonable goal of monetary policy as there is no reason to believe this
could be obtained through the use of monetary policy. Further, the Fed should not be focused
on a single goal--price stability--in any case. First, we are not sure what “price stability”
means because of measurement problems discussed above: the Bundesbank argues that the
CPI overstates inflation by 2 percentage points and the Fed has admitted the bias could be up
to 1.8 percentage points, while the Boskin report sets a conservative estimate of the upper-end
of the bias at 2.7 percentage points (Tietmeyer 1994; Schulkin 1993; Boskin et al 1995).
Particularly in the case of the service sector--from which most of our inflation comes--even
34these estimates may substantially understate the bias. With rapid technological change in the
medical sector, and perhaps in other parts of the service sector (secretarial services, education,
computing, financial services), it is difficult to account for quality improvements. With a
small margin for error above that admitted by central bankers (say, one percentage point), the
US was already at zero inflation--and perhaps even experiencing deflation--even before
monetary policy was tightened in spring of 1994.
Second, no one knows whether the benefit-cost ratio of say 4% inflation versus 2%
inflation is positive or negative. We don’t know the costs of 4% inflation nor do we know the
costs of lowering inflation. All will agree that when inflation hits double digits, costs are very
high. But what about inflation of  3%?  Assuming no further losses from the recent tightening,
was the loss of $1.5 trillion of financial wealth (that occurred during fall of 1994 due to the
Fed’s tightening (Muehring 1995) justified to fight imaginary inflation pressures when the
actual inflation rate less measurement bias may have been just above zero?
Third, as we have emphasized here, we do not know how central banks might fight
inflation nor do we know if they can reduce it. This is probably more controversial than the
previous two statements as almost everyone is willing to credit central banks for falling
inflation nearly world-wide over the past decade. We hope this paper has cast some doubt on
credit given to central bankers for recent low inflation. Of greater importance has been the
opening of US markets (particularly to low wage imports), decline of US trade unions,
stabilization of energy prices, rapid technological advance of (and falling price of) high tech
output, and collapse of real estate markets.’
35Fourth, there is simply no credible evidence that a moderate rise of interest rates
causes a smooth curtailment of spending plans. Indeed, the current market wisdom is that at
least a 450 basis point increase of interest rates is required to slow the economy (Muehring
1995). Fazzari (1993) has cast doubt on the supposed negative relation between interest rates
and investment spending, while we have shown that there is no reason to expect a smooth
inverse relation between interest rates and housing services prices. Nor is there any evidence
that monetary policy can slow inflation merely by reducing money growth rates. It appears
that tight money policy only works when it causes massive and widespread insolvency of
financial institutions--reducing credit supply--and greatly increases the portion of income
flows devoted to paying interest--reducing credit demand.
At a time when economists are questioning the reliability of data purported to measure
inflation, when economists are unsure of the appropriate targets to be used by the Fed to
achieve the goal of price stability, and, indeed, when it is not at all clear that the Fed has
much impact on the performance of a given aggregative index such as the CPJ, it is myopic
to narrowly focus monetary policy on price stability.
NOTES
1. Jordan (1993) has explicitly advocated use of a CPI target;  after  a brief implementation period, the Fed would
announce a specific target for the level of the CPI and then hold it there forever. Thornton (1988) was among the
first to urge the Fed to abandon traditional policy formation and to adopt inflation as both the target and ultimate
goal of policy. There is an  etfort  afoot led by Senator Connie  Mack  (current chairman of the JEC) to repeal the
Humphrey-Hawkins legislation of 1978 and to charge the Fed with the single goal of price stability. A notable
36dissenter from such proposals is Alan Blinder (1996) who supports the dual mandate provided in the Federal
Reserve Act, which directs the Fed to pursue stable prices and maximum employment. -
2. As noted above, Alan Blinder rejects the notion that the Fed should abandon all goals but price stability; in
addition, he examines and rejects the claim that the Fed can only impact nominal values. (Blinder 1996)
3. However, in a detailed examination of the literature on possible biases of the CPI, Wynne and Sigalla (1996)
find that “there is very little scientific basis for the commonly accepted notion that measured inflation at 2 to 3
percent a year is consistent with price stability”.  (p.  55) They conclude that previous studies had not been able to
make a strong case as to the likely direction of bias  -  it is about as likely that the  CPl  understates inflation.
4. Most economists would define price stability as a situation in which the overall price level is not rising; if the
CPI were a good measure of the rate of inflation, then price stability would be associated with a constant CPI.
However, if the CPI is biased, then price stability is achieved with a rising (or falling)  CPI.  If, as many
observers believe, the CPI overstates inflation by as much as two percentage points, then stable prices arc
associated with a measured CPI inflation rate of two percent. Chairman Greenspan has not explicitly endorsed
such a definition, but “price stability” appears to indicate a situation in which the CPI would be increasing only
due to measurement error.
5. Actually, adjustments  are  made during the intervening period as the BLS obtains new data on products and
consumer spending habits, however, long lags can occur.
6. Adapted from  Pollin  and Stone 1991, p. 55.
7. It is often claimed that the early concern of President and Hilary Clinton with the US health care system
helped to dampen medical cost increases due to focus on what was perceived to be excessive inflation in this
sector.
8. The lack of inflationary pressure is also apparent in the producer price indices from the early 1990s: finished
goods prices were increasing at less than one-half of one percent; finished consumer foods prices actually fell in
1994; and the inflation rate of  tinished  goods less energy and food reached only 0.30% and 0.50% in 1993 and
1994, respectively. In short, the producer price indices show no evidence of acceleration of inflation and give a
much different picture than they did just before the great inflations of the 1970s.
379. Especially that of homes  -  partly attributed to collapse of thrifts and to loss of some tax shelters; this is the
one area we would give the Fed some credit/blame for  inflation  fighting  -  by crippling thrifts it was able to
cause a temporary credit crunch in housing  tinance.  As depressed real estate markets can eventually affect base
year imputed rents, they can reduce imputed inflation of the OER, but only with a very long lag (since units
remain in the base for up to ten years).
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